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PREFACE
The past three decades have seen an appreciable growth
of interest in ethics both here and in Europe, with discussion equally fruitful in both the classical and modern positions.

The topics discussed, varied and wide-ranging as

the.problems they consider, continue to provide appreciation for the complexities that ethics must treat, whether the
views set forth have been one's own or that of a major figure.
This thesis is of the latter kind.

It centers direct-

ly on one theme in Aristotle's ethics, viz., the relation
there of Nature and moral excellence.

The topic is new,

little having been said about it previously.

Of course, in

one way or another it has made its way into different discussions about the Ethics, but more often than not just in
passing and not as a developed topic, which it is here.
This the first chapter should make clear.

There the

secondary literature is surveyed, showing that it is only
recently that Nature in the Ethics has been given any significant consideration at all.

Previously, Aristotle's

theory of moral goodness was discussed almost exclusively
in light of the notion of phronesis.

This, however, though

instructive, is only one way of regarding the topic.

When

we approach it in light of his theory of Nature in the
Ethics, our view widens.
Accordingly, chapter two locates the relation of

ii

Nature to the morally good.

Studying its role in the Pro-

trepticus, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Nichomachean Ethics,
we can see that it has a normative role, which is also confirmed in the Politics.

And this normative role arises

from Aristotle's general conviction that Nature, which is
responsible for the ends of all natural beings, is ari agency
of good.

Their ends, therefore, are their good; and thus

man's end is his good.

Human actions conducive to that end

are therefore good, and those detractive from it, bad.

That

is, they are according to or contrary to Nature respectively.
And it is with this in mind that the ethician, for Aristotle,
assigns a moral value to human actions.
Chapter three is concerned with the moral habits in
general and Aristotle's belief that none of these is ours
by nature.

Instead, he holds that it is we who bring about

our states of character and hence their excellence or vice.
Nevertheless, the propensity to virtue is ours by nature
and this, accordingly, has also merited discussion here.
These propensities, however, are not virtues in the
full sense.
chapter four.

True virtue involves reason and th{s we see in
Guided by a reason that is right the pass-

ions, Aristotle points out, achieve their proper excellences, their best states.
as an agency of good.

Reason, like Nature then, emerges
And this allows us to draw some par-

allels between our own good acts and Nature's operations.

iii

Virtue can now be accurately described as an imitation of
Nature.

And this is best seen in the contemplative man that

the Nichomachean Ethics describes, he who has all the virtues and with it the best of all goods.
The contemplative man, finally, the conclusion suggests, is the best expression of Nature's aspiration for
the divine. · Summary remarks are offered here too, bringing
the thesis to a close.
It should be noted here that this study, though discussing in the first chapter some aspects of the well-known
problems of the developmental hypothesis and Aristotle's
thought, is not directly concerned with it.

Such a dis-

cussion arose because the first chapter is an account of the
previous literature.

And the purpose of that was primarily

to show to what extent others had considered the theory of
Nature in Aristotle's Ethics.
The approach here, instead, is to detail those themes
about Nature that are consistent in the writings where Aristotle treats ethical problems at length.

These are the

Protrepticus, Eudemian Ethics, Nichomachean Ethics, Politics, and a work traditionally ascribed to the Aristotelian
tradition, the magna Moralia, with occasional references to
Aristotle's other writings, when appropriate.
I would, finally, like to thank those who read the
thesis along with me: Reverend Theodore Tracy, S.J., of the
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University of Illinois, whose own work on the Ethics has
added significantly to our appreciation of Aristotle as
physiobiologist; Dr. Frank Yartz of Loyola University,
whose encouragement and suggestions were always most helpful; and to my director, Reverend Lothar Nurnberger, S.J.,
also of Loyola University.

It is he who first suggested

the thesis topic to me when we worked on the Ethics two
years ago, and whose instruction and skill were wholly invaluable during the course of my writing.

It is, in fact,

only on his account that I was willing to explore this
topic at all, as well as see it to its successful completion.
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CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
The morally good, how it is known and in what it consists, for Aristotle has been variously interpreted during
this century, and for the most part only in light of his
account of phronesis.

The first extensive, and for some

time most influential, discussion of it appeared in Werner
Jaeger's Aristotle:
velopment. 1

Fundamentals~

the History

of~~-

Tracing the usage of phronesis in the Protrept-

icus, Eudemian Ethics, and Nichomachean Ethics, he argued
for a aevelopment in Aristotle's ethical theory-- from a
Platonism in the Protrepticus, where phronesis is nourished
by the objective reality of the Forms, to a purely subjectivist theory in the Nichomachean Ethics.

Here phronesis is

reduced to the discernment of means to an end that has been
2
The universal norms of the
"determined by the moral will''.
Protrepticus no longer function as guides for right conduct.
The standard now, according to Jaeger, is rather "the autonomous conscience of the ethically educated person". 3 "The
1First published in 1923 in German by the We~dmannsche
Buchhandlung, Berlin, as Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer
Geschichte seiner Entwicklung. In discussing and quoting
from Jaeger here we will use ill. Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals £! the History of His Development, translated with
the authors corrections and additions by R. Robinson. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1962, Second Edition (hereafter
referred to simply as Jaeger, Fundamentals).
2-

Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 242.

3-

Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 88, n. 1.

1

2

essence of moral value is now developed out of the subjective self", and thus the "transcendental norm" has become
"internalized" and with that voided of its universal validity.

"For there is no imperative that is binding on all men

equally, except a purely formal generalization devoid of
content.

Aristatle's aim is to unite the idea of complete

obedience to the norm with the greatest individual variety.
The moral personality is 'a law to itself 1 . " 4
The developmental hypothesis, of course, held great
sway, as did Jaeger's reading of the Protrepticus. 5 The
force of both today, though, has greatly diminished, and it
is not without interest to recount the change in opinion.
r~

will provide for a clearer understanding of how Nature

and the morally good are related for Aristotle, especially
since that relationship seems to have been so narrowly construed or simply ignored in the reaction to Jaeger, and
which has formed almost the entire bulf of the literature on
the Ethics since Jaeger.

Five major figures, then, will be

matter for discussion here, beginning with

Jaeger~.

The general preoccupation of Jaeger's Fundamentals is
Aristotle's theory of being.

Accordingly, {1) Aristotle was

first a Platpnist for whom being meant the Forms; .. {2) This

4-

Jaeger, Fundamentals, pp. 395-6.

5- See, e.g., E. Bignone, L'Aristotele perduto e la Formazione filosofia di Epicure. Florence: La Nueva Italia, 1936,
Two Volumes; P. Ulilpert, Zwei aristotelische Fruhschriften ·
liber die I deenlehre. Reg8fi'S1jurg: Habbel, 1949, pp. 64-5-;
and R. Gauthier, La morale d'Aristote. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958, pp. 6-7.

3
was replaced by a metaphysics heavily dominated by God, and
that in turn by a (3) thoroughgoing empiricism.
trepticus then, an early work,

6

In the ...........
Pro-

Aristotle for Jaeger is a

Platonist, a view he arrived at by his analysis of how phronesis

(~pov~al~ )

is used there.

7

Its object, according to

Jaeger, are the Platonic Forms, as is clear from the Platonic
language in which its object is described, e.g., au~a ~a

•

8

Phronesis,

then, is the contemplative knowledge of the Platonic Forms,
which at the same time, however, is also directive of conduct.

Being and value, which for Plato were one, have not

yet become disjoined according to Jaeger, and therefore the
.
9
Forms nourish both theoretic and practical knowledge.
Hence, phronesis is both theoretic and practical wisdom and is, according to Jaeger, directive of conduct more
geometrico.

10

In the Protrepticus, that is, is an "ideal of

6- Ross dates it around 353 B.C. See Sir David Ross, Select Fragments. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1952, P: x;
cf. I. Bywater, "On a Lost Dialogue of Aristotle", Journal
£! Philology, 2 (1869), 56-69.
7- "In the Protrepticus its meaning is purely Platonic",
Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 81. See also ibid., p. 82: "The
Protrepticus understands phronesis in the full Platonic
sen~e."

8- "Both the language and the philosophical content of this
passage is pure Plato", Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 90. See
also ibid., P• 91.
910-

Jaeger, Fundamentals, pp. 83-4.
Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 86.

4

geometrical ethics"~

11

Ethics, here, is an "exact science"

while politics, which Aristotle "considers inseparable from
ethics" has "the exact in itself for object." 12 Knowing
what is right in the concrete circumstance, therefore, requires reasoning geometrically from the Forms, which are
both the "exact" objects for knowledge as well as ethical
norms. 13
Persuasive as this reading of the Protrepticus

w~s

in

1923, in our day it has ceased to be so, and on two counts.
(1) Von Fritz and Kapp have shown a number of doctrines in
the Protreeticus to be clearly present in Aristotle's later
writings, thereby- rendering tenuous Jaeger's Platonizing of
the Protrepticus. 14 E. Frank advanced reasonings which directly questioned the position that Aristotle ever ascribed
to the theory of Forms, 15 while s. mansion has aigued for
the same, but on different grounds. 16
11- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 87. See also ibid., p. 85:
"This ideal of mathematical exactness is contrary to everything that Aristotle teaches in his Ethics and Politics about the method of these studies."

12-

Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 85.

13-

Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 93.

· 14- K. von Fritz and E. Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution of
Athens and Related Texts. New York: Hafner, 1950, p. 34:15- ·E. Frank, "The Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Aristotle", American Journal .E!.f. Philology, 61 (1940), 34-53
and 166-85.
16- s. mansion, "Contemplation and Action in Aristotle's
Protrepticus" in Aristotle and Plato In the Mid-Fourth Century, I. DUring and G.E.L. Owen (edd.):- Gbteborg: EleanderS
Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1960, p. 74.

5

(2) I. During has argued against Jaeger's characteri7ation of the Protreptican ethics as proceeding

~

geomet-

rico,17 as has J. Donald menan, whose own reading improved
upon and further substantiated During's criticism. 18 In its
stead, though, During opted for the autonomous insight of
the._
ble.

o'1l:ouoa' o'

' ,

<lVT)p

as the standard of the morally valua-

19
This is only one aspect, however, of his disagreement

with Jaeger's Protrepticus.

In addition, During rejects the
belief in a Platonic Aristotle, 20 and sees in the Protrepticus a marked distinction between theoretic and practical
knowledge. 21
I•

On this last point During was not successful.

Using

the same procedure by which During came to this position,
viz., an analysis of the language in the Protrepticus, 22

17-

I. DUring, "Aristotle In the Protrepticus" in Auteur
d 1 Aristote. Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1955, 81-97.

18- J. Donald monan, moral Knowledge and I!§ Methodology in
Aristotle. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press~ 1968, pp. 9-11
and 26-8 (hereafter monan, Moral Knowledge).
.
19- I. During, "Aristotle In the Protrepticus", ..2.2• cit.,
pp. 93-4.
20- I. DUring, "Aristotle and the Theory of Ideas", Eranos
37 (1938), 120-45. Cf. I. D~ring, "Aristotle In the Protrepticus", Q.Q. cit., pp. 91-2.
21- I. DUring, "Aristotle In the Protrepticus", ..2.2• cit.,
PP• 89-90. See, however, S. mansion, "Contemplation and
Action in Aristotle's Protrepticus", ..2.2• cit. She offers an
alternative view, viz., that moral wisdom is the practical
fruit of metaphysical speculation.
22- For this kind of analysis in During see his "Aristotle
In the Protrepticus", QQ. cit., p. 89.

6

E. de Strycher showed that "the language of the Fragments
gives us no conclusive evidence" on what the Protrepticus
teaches regarding the relation between theoretic and pract23
ical knowledge.
And while his rejection of Jaeger's Platonic Aristotle is, as we have seen, widely shared, his interpretation of the norm for ethical conduct, viz., the
, is not.
II

For During, this theory of moral autonomy is the
central feature of Aristotle's ethics, and is consistently
held throughout.

It is, furthermore, the dominant ethical

theme of the Protrepticus, the only ethical treatise in
which "there is no mention at all of the mean."

Instead,

is sovereign, in that he knows
what is right and wrong since (1) "his actions are lJJ-

IJ.T}O'lc; ab'twv axp&j3wv

", and (2) are what "such a man would

choose, if his choice followed his knowledge." 24
Such a knowledge, however, is not

a~

nor even a reasoning from established norms.

geometricus,
Rather it is

an intuition or unrationalizable insight, an opeac; AOyo~

, ,

enabling the
matters." 25

O.VT)p

"to judge

arig~t

in all

23- E. de Strycher, "On the First Section of Fragment 5a of
the Protrepticus" in Aristotle and Plato .!.!! the ffiid-Fourth
Century, ££• cit., p. 100.
24- I. DUring, "Aristotle In the Protrepticus"; .Q£•
pp. 93-6.
25-

~-'

p. 94.

EJ:!.,

7

This theme, being present for D~ring in all three
26
ethical tracts,
prompted him to deny any difference in
outlook between the early and later ethics.
The development does not follow a straight line, which,
as Jaeger thought, can be measured in terms of distance
from Plato ••• we should rather think of a boomerang
curve, for in the last !J.E9ooo~
of the Nichomachean
Ethics, after having made an excursion in the field of
_~mpirical sociology, Aristotle returns to hLs old hunting grounds and comes nearer to the Protrepticus than in
any other part of the ethical works. 27
Whether or not this last observation is correct, the
justification for it has recently been questioned by menan.
II

Though siding with During that Jaeger's theory of a mos
geometricus in the Protrepticus is unfounded, 28 he criticIt

izes During's suggestion that the Protrepticus is
a ted" by the concept of the cmouocil o~

avT)p
I

'

~domin-

, especial-

ly since there is only one text there supporting During's
. t•~on. 29

pos~

A further difficulty he cites is that D~ring

has not elaborated on how this inccimmunicable knowledge of
the morally good finds concrete application in everyday
life.

The reason, Monan -believes, is obvious enough:
"the
~

~

.,

-.

-·

method of moral knowledge employed by Aristotle in the Pro. 30
trepticus is not adequately desc~ibed."
To resolve this
26- ibid., pp. 91-2. These three are the Protrepticus,
demian-Ethics, and Nichomachean Ethics.

pp. 96-7.

27-

~.,

28-

menan, moral Knowledge, p. 26; p. 54.

29-

menan, moral Knowledge, pp. 11-12; p. 27.

30-

menan, Moral Knowledge, P• 34.

f..!:!-

8

difficulty, monan mod~fies the difference D~ring found between theoretical and practical in the Protrepticus.

The

phronimos, according to Monan, is the only competent judge
of the moral good in concrete circumstances, not because of
any "creative autonomy" but on account of "his possession of
a philosophic wisdom which is to be reduced to practice." 31
This view is characteristic of rfionan's general reading of
the Ethics, as we shall see later when we discuss his views
at greater length.

,.

llihile During, then, levelled his criticism primarily
against Jaeger's Protrepticus, others have done the same to
Jaeger's reading of the Eudemian Ethics.
of phronesis again as the key to his

Using the doctrine

finding~,

Jaeger

see~

it there still as
strictly confined to the contemplation of the divine
principle, and without it ethical action is impossible;
the only innovation is that the objects of contemplation
are no longer Plato's Ideas but tne transcendentalGod
of the original metaphysics ••• ethical action is striving towards God. 32
Thus, "in the E udemian Ethics A_ristotle is still expressing the direct relevance of God to moral action, as he
had done earlier by means of the Platonic conception of the
absolute norm." 33 The only difference now is that God is

31- ·monan, moral Knowledge, p. 36o
32- Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 240. See ibido, p. 239: "By
ghronesis the Eudemian Ethics understands like Plato and the
Protrepticus, the philosophical faculty that beholds the
highest real value, God, in transcendental contemplation."
33-

Ja~ger,

Fundamentals, p. 242.

9

asserted as the absolute value or the highest goad.

Will

and command, then, "arise only when reason or phronesis devotes itself to the contemplation of this being."

34

Contemplation, therefore, is "the standard of will
and action" in the Eudemian Ethics, while phronesis remains
"both theoretical knowledge of supersensible being and
practical moral insight."

35

moral action, in other words,

is judged according to whether or not it conduces to contemplation, in light of a wisdom that is "partly the knowledge of an objecti~e value ( 9e(l.)p'r)'tl'X.OV

), and partly

the application of this knowledge to human behaviour."

36

All this, however, according to Jaeger, is discarded

in the Nichomachean Ethics.

"There are no universal norms,

there is no measure except the individual living measure of
the autonomous ethical person, and phronesis is concerned
not with the universal, but the particular."

37

"It is not

speculation but deliberation ••• it is concerned not with the
universal but the fleeting details of life, and ••• therefore
does not have-the highest and most valuable thing in the
universe for objec-t .'.• 36

wrts-

f~nction

is ••• to

disco~er

-

the right means of attaining the end determined by the moral
34-

Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 242.

35-

Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 239.

36-

Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 242.

37-

Jaeger, Fundamentals, pp. 87-8.

38-

Jaeger, Fundamentals, p. 83.

10
39
will"
which is now grounded in a subjective self.
The Platonism of the Protrepticus, then, collapses
into a subjectivist ethics which, for Jaeger, is Aristotle's
final view on the matter.

And the Eudemian Ethics, the

"theonomic ethics ••• of pure devotion to God" fades.

Con-

templation
becomes little more than an objective if idealized description of the life of the scholar devoted to research,
rising at the end to the intuition of the ultimate force
that guides the spheres ••• The strength of the later
Ethics lies rather in its parts, with their analysis of
concrete moral types, ~nd-in it~-rich and urbane human- ity. 40
D.J. Allan is
view.

pe~haps

the first to-have dismissed this

In a lively but erudite study he challenged the gen-

eral consensus of a gradual evolution of Aristotle's
thought, 41 as well as Jaeger's description of phronesis in
42
the Nichomachean Ethics.
There he quite conclusively
showed that it has to do with both the means and end of human activity, while Monan has cited texts to contradict
Jaeger's picture of phronesis in the Eudemian Ethics. 43
In addition, two articles by Allan in 1953 and 1955
continu-ed th-e dispute,- taking into account, ·however the lit39-

Jaeger, fundamentals, p. 247.

40-

Jaeger, fundamentals, p. 243.

41- D.J. Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle.
Home University Library, 1952, p. 14.
42-

~.,

43-

Menan, Moral Knowledge, pp. 138-9.

pp. 180-2.

London: The

11
erature of the nineteenth century.

44

While Teichmaller,

Trendelenburg, and Zeller, Allan points out, all held that
phronesis in the Nichomachean Ethics has to do with both
the right end and the right means to it, Julius Walter
ascribed the apprehension of the end to moral virtue, limiting phronesis exclusively to deliberation about the means to
it.- This view, Allan further notes, became Zeller's, and
thus Burnet's and, as a result, all of

Oxfo~d's.

R. Loaning, however, in 1903 disputed Walter's claim,
showing that prudence, as right kn-owledge accompanied by
right desire, not only posits the right end, but also is the
virtue of right deliberation and choice about the means to
that end.

A~lan•s

1953 essay repeats and reinforces Loen-

ing's findings with, however, the texts needed to end the
.
t 45
d l.SpU e.

Gauthier, agreeing with Allan's findings, 46 presented
44- See D.J. Allan, "Aristotle's Account of the Origin of
moral Principles" in Aetas du XIe Congr~s International de
Philosophie. Amsterdam: The North Holland\Publishing_ Company, 1953, Vol. XII, pp. 1~1-7; and "The Practical Syllog~
ism" in Auteur d'Aristote, .££• cit., pp. 325-40.
45- "That prac-tical reason formulates the good is the doctrine of t~e De Anima, and appears beyond doubt from the following passages of the Ethics: VI, 1139a 21 ••• , VI, 1142b 31
••• , VII, 1152-b 1~ 1' D.J. Allan, "Aristotle's Account of the
Origin of moral Principles", .Q.Q.• cit.,- p~ 125.

,

46- R. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, L'Ethigue ~ Nicomague, introduction, traduction, et commentaire~ Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1958, Tome I, p. 28*; and
R. Gauthier, La morale d'Aristote, !?.2• cit., pp... 83 and 94.

12

a view of the Ethics far different from Jaeger's. 47
/-

L'Ethigue

~

In

Nicomague he argues for the similarity of teach-

ing in the Eudemian Ethics and Nichomachean Ethics, based
upon the doctrine of moral knowledge in each.

Phronesis in

both tracts furnishes objective norms for human praxis and
in light of the true end of human activity.

Jaeger's dis-

tinction, then, of a theonomic ethics in the Eudemian Ethics and the autonomy-of the individual conscience in the
Nichomachean_Ethics is unfoun_ded. 48 . Aristotle, on the c_ontrary, had already in the Eudemian Ethics discarded the Pla- -tonic theory of phronesis, which he had'-sb ar-de-ntly 'espoused
49
in the Protrepticus,
and in~tead began- to formulate an
ethics built upon his own anthropology. 50 This, in fact,
47Not entirely different, however. He sees some merit
in Jaeger's position on amos geometricus in the Protrepticus and thinks the theory of moral knowledge ih the Etidemian
"ftiiics to parallel,this somewhat. On this seeR. Gauthier
and J.Y .• Jolif, l'Ethigue a Nicomague, £E• cit., p. 29*, and
R. Gauthier, La Morale d'Aristote, £E• cit., pp. 18, 44, and
45.
,
48- R. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, L'Ethigue a Nicomague, ~·
cit., p. 29*. See also R. Gauthier, La Morale d'Aristote,
£E• cit., p. 95.
49- Gauthier, in contrast to most of the contemporary readers of the- Protrepticus, agrees with Jaeger 1 s theory· of'- the
Platonic Protrepticus. SeeR. Gauthier, La morale d'Arist-_
ate, £E• cit., pp. 6..;.7.
· --· · · · · ··
50- Though he does not elaborate this, Gauthier seems to be
saying that in the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle's ethical theory is now discussed in terms of man as a
substantial unity in contrast to the Platonic theory of man
in the Protrepticus where soul and,body are in conflict.
See R. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, L'Ethigue ~ Nicomague, .2.2• ·

ill•'

P.• 30* •

13

''com~ande pour une large part la doctrine" 51 while phrones/

/

is, though admittedly "practique" and "impregne de desir"
52
remains primarily "intellectuelle".
These last two conclusions, novel in interpretation
and set forth

in~

morale d'Aristote, were summarily dis-

missed by monan, the last major figure in our survey here.
He rightly noted that Gauthier in fact wavers on the difficult problem_ of determining -the nature of phro-nesis- -i.-e • .,
deciding whether or not it is intellectual-- and was not at
all clear on what he meant by an anthropological ethics. 53
To this last point

~e

will return in our second

chapt~r,

after Menan's views have been discussed.
Monan's work, Moral Knowledge and Its methodology In
Aristotle, is the most significant for our purposes here
since, unlike the previous literature, it is the first to
discuss the role of Nature in moral goodness for Aristotle
at any length.

Previous scholarship, being in large a re-

action to Jaeger, focused primarily on only one aspect of
it, viz.,

_i~s

relation to phronesis.

And though menan's

work is also preoccupied with this same issue, in the course
of.his.discussion some pertinent remarks concerning Nature·
have come up, and these merit discussion.

51- R. Gauthier, La morale d'Arfstote, .!!!!• .£.!!., p. 44.
See also ibid., p. 17: "Les traites de morale d'Aristote
contiennent une anthropologie", and pp. 18, 19, 43, and 44.
52-

~.,

53-

ffio·nan, moral Knowledge, pp. 55 and 58.

pp. 82-4.
monan himself

(~., p. 81) characterizes phronesis as a synthesis of

"true reason and right desire".

14

Nature, according to monan, grounds correct moral awareness in the Protrepticus.

But more than ? reading of

Nature is required to be morallt good.

There is also the

business of applying these principles formulated

-

~~~

"
~uaeoo~

.

...

(l'JtO

to the concrete individual situations of pract-

ical living.

This is accomplished not by a mechanical chain

of reasoning ~ la Jaeger, but in accordance with the "essentially imperfect, approximate realizations or

veri~icat

ions of such principle in concrete situations of life.n 55
moral awareness, though derived from principles formulated
by a study of

Nature~has

to do_with their."limit-

pr~marily

56
.
t.~on " ~n
. d al. 1 y 1.1v1ng.
.
e d rea 1 ~za

In the later Ethics, h.owever, Nature loses its importance.

"Nowhere in Aristotle's explicit doctrine of moral

knowledge is nature mentioned as a pattern from which one
could read off the goodness or badness of prospective cond uc t • .. 57 "More clearly than the Protrepticus, the Nichemachean Ethics makes clear that the principles themselves
are derived from no pre-existing metaphysically elaborated
absolute, but from the concrete situations of life where
alone man can realize a value~" 58
and

I

"Gone· ~s ~reality-itself'·

eternal things I 11 aS the Objecf Of moral knOWlBdliB ttto

be replaced by the contingent, individualized prakton aga55-

menan, moral Knowledge, p. 149.

56-

menan, moral Knowledge, p. 149.

57-

menan, moral Knowledge, p. 90.

58-

menan, moral Knowledge, p. 81 •
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than; a value to be realized in conduct.n

59

In the later Ethics, according to Monan, the morally
good is known pre-philosophically.

It is not arrived at by

a speculative study, nor by a philosophic study of man's
nature, but rather by actual concrete praxis.

To know what

is morally good is possible only by doing it, and therefore
oniy in the lived situation.

60

The norm for

goodness~

is grasped in the experential and can be recognized

than,

on~y

by

one whose consistent good conduct has furnished him therefore with the awareness of right and wrong, i.e., by the
.

p h rom.mos.

61

It is het in fact, who becomes the locus of

the morally right, the standard of what it is objectively
good to do.

Virtuous habituation has given him the eye to

see immediately, without reflection or deliberation, how the
good is to be realized in a particular instance.

And

~t

is

this intuition, Monan believes, that has replaced the Protreptican contemplation of Nature as·the source of our knowledge of right and wrong.
59-

Monan, Moral Knowledge, p. 152.

60- This ffionan holds is true for both the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics; see Monan, moral Knowledge, pp; 144-6.

-

61-

Monan, moral Knowledge, p. 80; p. 152.

CHAPTER I I
NATURE AND THE mORAL GOOD
A survey of the secondary literature on Aristotle's
theory of the morally good, then, shows that the importance
of Nature there has only been of late a topic of discussion,
and for the most part only in ffionan's study.

In a work pub-

lished the same year as Menan's, W.F.R. Hardie's Aristotle's
.
62
Ethical Theory,
it is discussed only very briefly, while

J. Owens in a 1969 article sees it for

Aristotl~

a& "convinc-

ing enough grounds for ethical universality" 63 without, however, any extended discussion as to why.

What requires our

attention, then, is an examination of how Nature

a~pe~rs

in

Aristotle's ethical works and to see if. it does not take on
a role more expansive than the previous literature

allowed~

Accordingly, we will discuss three themes that emerge from
this reading: (1) Nature as an agency of good; (2) the
sense, therefore, in which Nature can be considered normative in a study of ethics, and (3) Nature and right action.
As early as the Protrepticus, whose Platonic characterization by Jaeger is, as we have seen, no longer so widely
held, Aristotle advanced a thesis that was to appear again
in a slightly different phrasing in the Politics: "that
which is contrary to Nature (

~ap4

,

cpua1 v

) is ba~, -and -

62- W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory.
the Clarendon Press, 1968.

Oxford: at

63- J. Owens, "The Grounds of Ethical Universality in Aristotle .. , man and World, 2 (1969), 182-3.
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17
the opposite of that which is according to Nature (xa.'t'ci
,6aLY )." 64 Things, therefore, generated by Nature, and
hence for an end, the Protrepticus continues, come about
65
rightly or well, and also xa.A.wc; •
Again, in the Nichomachean fthics: "In the world of Nature things have a natural tendency to be ordered in the best possible way", 66 a
view fully in line with what is said about

man~s

end in the

Eudemian Ethics: "by nature (,Gael ) the End .is always a
good ••• but in contraversion to nature (na.pcl cpuar.v ), and
by perversion, not the good but the apparent good is the,
end. 1167 Nature, then, is a CaLise Ujhose PL!rposes are g~od,
68
and whatever contravenes that purpose is not right.
64- Ingemar During, Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt'
at Reconstruction. Gotebor~: Eleanders 8oktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1961, fragment 8 15 {hereafter simply During, Aristotle's Protrepticus, with the fragment number identified
simply by 8 anc} then th2 numb~r), Cf.- PQ1i tics; VII, 3,
1325b 10-11: ouoev OE ~~Y napa. ,uatv xaKov • My reasons for
using OGring's edition of the Protrepticus, b~ing somewhat
lengthy, have accordingly been set forth in an Appendix (A)
at the end of the thesis, rather than in the footnote here.
65-

OGring, Aristotle's Protrep~ticus, 8 14, _8_1_~-·~

..

,

-

"l'..

,

v

v

,

66- Tu. XO.'tO. cpu a 1'1~ Cllt; 0 t. OY ~S XO.AA t. 0~0. &XS t. V" OU't'<sl 'lt&cpUX£V.
The Nichomachean Ethics (hereafter f.N.); I, 9 1 1099b 20-23.
English translation by H. Rackham in Aristotle: !..!:!! Nichomachean Ethics. The Loeb Classical Library. London: William
Heinemann, 1926.
67- Eudemian Ethics (hereafter E .E.), I I, 10, 1227a 18-23 •.
English translation by H. Rackham in Aristotle: The Athenian
Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtues andv'ices.
The Loeb Classical Library. London:Ulilliam H"'8Tiiemann, 1935.
68-

Politics, VII, 3, 1325b 10-11.

could not survive. 74
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Each and every being that comes to be

by Nature is our proof for this principle then.

And it is

reasonable to suppose that when we undertake to reason about natural things this should be

on~

of our guiding

threads.
Such a principle would seem to have a role in ethics
too since there our study is about the end of man who, because a natural being, has come about for an end that is·
rightly described as his good.

In three of his ethical

tracts, in fact, Aristotle argues for a final end to human
activity

preci~ely

jn_terms of the design of

~Nature~

in each_

case describing it as his most worthwhile good.
that is called
In the Protrepticus it is ~povetv
his end 75 because this is the excellence of his highest faculty, 76 and Nature se~ks the exc~lleriri~ of everything.
Reasoning from the purpose of Nature we find that our end
resides in th~ exercize or function (

M

epyov

) proper to

,

or the attainment of
, viz., cppov€tv
l <;
,.
77
truth,
because cppOVT)Ol(;
by nature ( cpuael
) is

~.POVT)O

what last comes to be in man.
74-

And that which is. last at-

De Anima, III, 12, 435b 2-7.

75- D~ring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, B 20, B 30; 8 69-70;
cf. B 95.
76-

During, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 8 62-67; cf. B 95.

77- On the basis of combining B 20 with B 65 I have made
this identification of cppove' v
with the attainment .
of truth.
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tained in the order of a being's generation is its end according to Nature (

xa~d

#

)•

<pUCJLV

78

man's end by

nature therefore resides in the exercize of the best part
of his soul, since it is this exercize which is the best of
all things 79 while all the other excellences of the soul
exist for the sake of this end. 80
In the Eudemian Ethics this theme is not so vigorously
pursued, ·but nevertheless natural design fits into the discussion of man's good.

men naturally (

#

q)\.)CJ e'

) wish for

what is good, and only contrary to nature ( napd
do they wish for something bad.

8~

#

q>UCJ i V

)

) the

nature (

object or end, about whose means for attainment they deliberate, is good; and only contrary to nature ( 'ltapci. cpuaav

)

and by perversion will one pursue the apparent, and not real,
good. 81
These phrases, however, "contrary to nature" and "accord~ng

Ethics.

to nature" are not really explained in the Eudemian
To understand them and why they are used we must go

to the Nichomachean Ethics.
about that excellence and

Here the Protreptican argument
II

epyov

for which

m~n's

soul

has been designed by Nature is again set forth, but now with
certain precisions.
78-

With these the phrases

11

contrary to

During, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 8 9, 8 17.

79- During, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 8 20.
iv i ty is called cppov€1. v
•

Here the acti-

80-

DUring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 8 23, 8 24; cf. 8 68.

81-

f.f..,

II, 10, 1227a 20-30.
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nature" and "according to nature" as well as what is natural and what is perverse take on definite and technical
meaning, and precisely in light of this theory of natural
design.

Along with this, then, why Aristotle uses such

terms also becomes clear.
In the Eudemian Ethics, just as in the Protrepticus
and the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle had identified the
good for man by considering what function or exercize.

( epyov) is proper to the human soul.

Unlike the doctrine

of the Protrepticus and the Nichomachean

Ethics~

however,

he seems to have a somewhat broader understanding of the
soul here.

Since the function of the soul, according to

the Eudemian Ethics, is to give life, and therefore also
the function of its best state or excellence, the function
of that excellence will be a good life, which is happiness.
Happiness, though, is more truly an activity than a state,
and therefore will be an activity of perfect life in accordance with complete virtue ( lvepyeia xa~'

A.dav

ape~nv

~e-

). 8 2

cipe:.,;T)v

The key phrase here is
translates "complete virtue".

~e'Aeiav

which

According to J. Donald Monan

this indicates that Aristotle conceives of happiness as inelusive of the whole soul.
onymous with
82-

oA.~

,

"In the E.f.

~e:A.eiav

is syn-

i.e., perfect in the sense of entire,

f.f., II, 1, 1219a 24-38.
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composed of a variety of virtues."

83

For this reason ffionan holds that there are two psychologies operant in the Ethics.

In both the Protrepticus

and the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle had identified man
primarily with vou' , but in the Eudemian Ethics "by implicatton at least, with the broader psyche"·~ 84

The Eudemian

Ethics, in other words, is favored with a mqre "integral
psychology ••• the psychological horizon of the f.E. has
broadened beyond the narrow identification of man with his
85
nous."
Though in fact Aristotle does in both the Protrepticus and the Nichomachean Ethics, but not the Eudemian
ics, speak of man as being vouc;

f!h-

more than anything else, 86

monan•s conclusion that a different psychology of man is
present in the Eudemian Ethics is not really that convincing.

For to speak of the excellence of the whole soul as

an element in happiness is in no way to suggest that man is
not primarily vouc; •

It is rather simply to assert the bas-

83- Monan, Moral Knowledge, p. 124. menan's reason for
this identification is textual: "In the E.E. a few lines
I
'
7
~
I
, -'\
,
)
earlier we find: e'lt.El
Oe' T)V
~~ euOaq.LoVla. "te"'eov
"tll x.a.l'
eo"tt~ ~oo~ xa.t "te')..ea. xa.t ~"tEA~t; 1 xa.f ~pe"t~ &oa.u"too' (~ ~ev
ydp o')..T), ~ Oe ~oploV, and it is the former which fiQures
in the definition of happiness", ibid., p; 124.

84-

Menan, moral Knowledge, p. 126.

85-

menan, moral Knowledge, p. 131.

86-

In the Protrepticus, 8 29; the

I

I·!·'

X, 7, 1178a 7.
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ic tenet that complete happiness, and therefore the full
excellence of the soul; can come about only when all the
powers of the soul have come to their full excellence or
realization.

No statement about man is involved here,

then; simply a condition of his happiness is.
If, however, we want to know that aspect of man that
Aristotle holds indispensable to the study of ethics we
must know what it is that differentiates him from all other
natural beings or, put otherwise, makes him man.

for it is

man's end that ethics seeks to define, and no other.
Accordingly, having eliminated pleasure, honor, virtue, and the Good of the Platonists as man's end, 87 Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics turns to examine what the
final end of all human action is, and how it can be attained
by man.

All properly human acts, acts done knowingly and

with purpose, he points out, are done on account of
that is apprehended as desirable.

a~

~nd

Some ends, however, are

more final than others, some ends really being means to a
further end.

For example, though the purpose of working is

remuneration, this is not an end in itself.

Rather, it be-

comes a means for support and sustenance and is therefore
by no means something final.

Only what is not a means to

something else, but is an end chosen exclusively for its own
sake, is absolutely fina1. 88
And in the order of human action this end is happi•
87-

f..~.,

88-

E.N., I, 7, fb97a 26-34.

I, 3-6, 1095a 1 - 97a 15.
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, since we always choose it for its own
sake, and never as a means to something else.

Once it has

been attained, desire for anything further ceases.

Happi-

ness by itself is alone sufficient to render life desirable,
and any effort needed for its attainment worth the while.
Thus it is happiness which is the end of all human action,
happiness which is man's complete good.

89

Something is completely goad, however, only when that
function ( ~pyov

) proper to it is exercized.

Its perfect-

ion lies in mare than the mere possession of such a functian.

Far example, the complete goad of flute playing, Ar-

istotle points aut, consists not merely in the ability to
play the flute well, but in the actual good playing of it.
Tharefore, since happiness is man's complete goad, then
what the proper function of man is must be determined so that
we may find haw happiness comes about.

And being man's com-

plate good, it too will reside in some sort of exercize,
and not just a possession or patency. 90
To locate something's complete goad, then, requires
that its characteristic function be identified, since its
specific good entails the actual exercize

or

it.

And that

man has such a function, Aristotle paints out, seems clear
enough from the fact that each class

or

man does (e.g., the

cobbler's is to make good shoes, the teacher's to instruct
well), as do even his bodily parts.
89-

f.N.,

I, 7, 1097a 34- b 20.

90-

f.~.,

I, 7, 1097b 22- 27.

llie can assume then that
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man has a function unique to him, and for this, Aristotle
,
91
explicitly says, he has been designed ~e~uxev , by nature.
And it is reason

(Aoyo~

) that is this function since

this alone differentiates him and makes him unique from all
other organic life, and is alone that in virtue of which
92
The life proper to man is
human life can be called happy.
one which functions according to reason.

And hence the good

proper to him will be an activity in accord with reason, or
more specifically its excellence.
Hence, for Aristotle to show how man's end is to be
attained we must know that characteristic function for which
91E.N., I, 7, 1097b 30-35. The line of reasoning here
is: if-Nature has ordained even the most insignificant parts
of the human body to do a certain work, ~ fortiori it has
man, for he is far nobler than these. ~~uxev ,. of course,
is the key word here. Rackham (p. 31 of his translation of
the I·!:!·' .Q.E• cit.), J.A.K. Thompson (p. 38 of his, I!:!!
Ethics of Aristotle. London: Penguin Books, 1959), Ostwald
{p. 16 of his, Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics. New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1962)t and Tricot (p. 57, Ethique a Nicomague.
Paris: J. Vrin, 1959) give it the force of natural or by
nature, while RobS (p. 942 in !hg Basic Works of Aristotle,
R. McKeon (ed.). New York: Random House, 1941~and Dirlmeier
(p. 14, Nikomachische Ethik. Berlin: Akadamie-Uerlag, 1956)
give it the meaning of being born with. liddell-Scott (p.
773, Greek Lexicon. London: Oxford, 1974, Abridged Edition)
allows for its translating as "the nature" or "naturally",
and this is certainly both a permissible and accurate translation here. This is clear from£.£., .II, B, 1224b 32-34:
"the two marks by which we define the natural (-ro ~6o~a " which can also translate as "that which is by nature"-) " it is that which is found with us as soon as we are born, or
that which comes to us i f growth is allowed to proceed regularly, e.g., grey hair, old age, and so on;" Engli'h translation by J. Solomon in The Works of Aristotle Translated
Into English, w.o. Ross TS'd.). London: Oxford, 1966, Vol.~ Cf. During, Aristotle's Protrepticus' 8 16, where Aristotle says man has come into being ~3oel and xa-rd ~UOlV.;
and 8 23: man is by nature (~6aea ) composed of body and
soul.
·
92-

I•!:!•, I, 7, 1098a 1-20.
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he has been designed by nature; for it is in the excellence
of this function that his end consists.

And for Aristotle

we have seen that man has been designed by Nature to live in
accordance with reason, and that by so living he brings about his own well-being.
Ethics, then, requires a knowledge of the nature of
man; it has an anthropological tenor.

The statesman, in

fact, is said to need this knowledge since ethics is most
properly political in scope, its area of concern being in'

eluded in and subordinated to politics, the master science. 93
If the lawmaker's task is to make his fellow-citizens good,
he must have an understanding of man's soul, since only in
this way can he know the end for which Nature has brought
him to be.

In so understanding the soul, then, he will be

able to promote their happiness and well-being, or guide
them in that life which arises from reason. 94
The significance of this line of reasoning emerges far
more forcefully in Book X with Aristotle's identification of
man wi :th vout; •

It is because man is especially vout; that

~~ dvepw~~ a~

6 xa~d ~~v vouv ~Cot;, efnep ~ou~o ~dALO~«.
4vepoonot; since, as had already been established,~o ~p·o~ 5
x.eLov £xcia~4l -til cpuael xpci~lo~ov xat Tja,o~ov !a~Lv £x&.cn(tl.

-

93-

I·~·•

I, 2-4, 1094a 18- 95b 11.

94-

I·~·'

I, 13, 1102a 7-24.

95- E.N., X, 7, 1178a 5-8• English translation (Rackham):
first-part-- "the life of the intellect is the best and most
pleasant for man"; second part-- .. that which is best and .
most pleasant for each creature is that which is proper to
the nature of each."
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Human happiness therefore, properly speaking, consists in
the best activity of the intellect, and thus that which is
the excellence of the best part in us.
It is for this reason that Aristotle has. shifted the
first book's emphasis from
ence to

now in Book

vouc;

)..oyo~

as man's specific differ-

x.

Nouc;

,

as that which is

best in man, is what identifies him most truly since each
thing is defined by its en d96 and that which is best in a
thing is most truly its end.

Eudaimonia, then, will only

come about through the excellence of that which is best in
man, viz.' vouc;

•

And as that activity in accord with

such excellence it will be his best good.
Nouc;

, however, as being man's best end, is so by

nature since in the generation of natural beings the end is
by nature.

97

Therefore that good which is best for man,

viz., eudaimonia, is by natural design.

And as that for

which all human action takes place, eudaimonia is most satisfying when the intellect has reached its excellence, viz.,
contemplative activity.

This is most truly its good, as

well as our most pleasant state.
Thus, for Aristotle, "in man rational principia

(

A.oyo~

) and mind ( vouc; ) are the end towards which nat)",

96-

98

the excellence of

E.N., III, 7, 1115b 23.

97- On this see D~ring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 6_13,
B 15.
98- Politics, VII, 15, 1334b 14-16. English translation by
B. Jowett in the Basic Works of Aristotle, .2£• ill•
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which brings about happiness, our best good.

Anything de-

tractibg from this end or good, therefore, goes contrary to
Nature; anything contributing to it is in accordance with
Nature.
We have then the reason for and meanings of what Aristotle understands by the natural and unnatual in regard
to human conduct.

If our end is something good and attain-

able through our own agency, then whatever choice-motivated
conduct befits that end is morally good, while what does not
is morally bad.

The end and good of man, however, is by

natural design.

And therefore the morally good turns out

to be what is according to Nature, while the morally bad is
what perverts or contravenes Nature.
To be morally good for Aristotle, then, is to fit into
the design of Nature, to act in accordance with its plan.
Things that are done rightly, therefore, are done according
to Nature, while the "wicked man is contrary to nature
( na.pd. <pOOlV )." 99 Accordingly, moral goodness and man's
end by nature converge: whatever is morally good accords
with it, while whatever accords with that end is morally
good.
Such is the sense and sigpificance of natural and unnatural in Aristotle's ethical terminology.

Convinced of the

goodness of the natural design and thus of the goodness of
man's end he is therefore able to ascribe value to human
99- E.f., VII, 6, 1240b 20-21. English translation by H.
Rackham in Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtues and Vices, ~· cit.
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acts in light of that design.

Clearly, then, Nature has

significance in the study of human conduct for Aristotle.
As that which has fashioned man's end, its design is therefore for him the criterion and norm by which the ethician
.can speak of the goodness and badness of human acts.
And it is only in this sense that it is normative.
Natural design does not serve as a landmark for the man immersed in daily living.

He does not look "with an eye to

Nature" to see whether and how he should or should not act
in a certain circumstance.

Rather, experience

wi~l

provide

the eye and, as such, to the good man for seeing what the
good to be done in such matters is, an experience, however,
based on habituation to good action. 100 for the good man
this habituation is the fabric of moral knowledge.

It is

the habituation of choosing rightly by one reared in virtuous conduct and correct instruction, and who has thereby
come to grasp the principles of right and wrong, 101 as well
as what the true good of human action is. 102
This,

~n

other terms, is the phronimos.

He has acq-

uired the excellence of practical reasoning, that good
100-

f.~.,

VI, 12, 1144a 29-31.

101- E.N., I, 4, 1095b 4-13; II, 1, 1103a 14-16; X,. 9,
1179b 21~27; VII, 8, 1151a 15-19. Aristotle speaks of the
apprehension of these particulars as coming by way of induction from particular situations, and thus culminating iri
an immediate intuitive grasp; cf. f.fl., I, 7, 1098b 2-4; VI,
3, 1139b 26-31; VI, 11, 1143b 3-5, and Analytica Posteriora,
II, 19.
102-

£.~.,VI,

11, 1143a 33-35.
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103
moral reasoning which concludes in right action,
and is
set forth by Aristotle as our canon for good living. 104 His
virtue, being the mark of right reason, 105 is the test of
all human actions as to their goodness or badness.
Nevertheless, even here we may say that Nature is, operant, if only in the background, for Aristotle.

That which

is right, we have seen, is what accords with Nature.

reason that

i~

A

right, then, will be one that accords with

Nature, i.e., one whose aims and directives parallel Nat103- We must be very clear on this point. For Aristotle,
the practical syllogism does not precede action; rather, it
culminates in it. "In a practical syllogism the major premis is an opinion, while the minor premis deal with particular things, which are the province of perception. Now
when the two premises are combined, just as in theoretic
reasoning the mind is compelled to affirm the resulting conclusion, so in the case of practical premises you are
forced to do it. For example, given the premises 'All sweet things ought to be tasted 1 and 'Yonder thing is
sweet•-- a particular instance of the general class, you are
bound, if able and not prevented, immediately ( !~a ) to
taste the thing", E.N., VIII, 3, 1147a 25-32. English translation by H. Rackham in Aristotle: The Nichomachean Ethips,
.QE• cit.
Cf. De Anima, III, 11, 434a 16-21; and De Motu
AnimaTium, I, 6=7. Here Aristotle tells us that Tn regard
to reasoning about things to be done our "two premises result in a conclusion which is an action ••• it is clear that
the action is a conclusion." English translation by A.s.L.
Farquharson in ~ Works of Aristotle Translated Into ~
.!l!ill' ..Q£• .£!!., 1912, Vol. 5. Also, I•!!•t VII, 9, 1152a
7-10: "Prudence does not consist only in knowing what is
right, but also in doing it". English translation by H.
Rackham in Aristotle: The Nichomachean Ethics, .QE• cit.
104- Actually, Aristotle says the good man is "as it were"
( OO'litp ) the standard of the noble and pleasant, f..•.!:!•t
III, 4, 1113a 32-35. But in the Protrepticus (During, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 8 39) he is called the xav~v
-or
what is good since when his choice follows his knowledge the
things that he chooses are good, and their contraries avi~.
Presumably, though not stated here, this knowledge (here,
!1tLO'tWTJ
) is both of Nature and things eternal.
105-

f...~.,

VI, 13, 1144b 24-25.
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ure's.

Phronesis, then, as the virtue of acting rightly

from a reason that is right, is how human action best parallels Nature.

And since it is the virtue of the good man,

the good man in acting rightly and doing what is good can
quite accurately be described for Aristotle as one who acts
as_jature does.

more to the point, in doirig what is good

and thus sustaining his own well-being, he is co-operating
with Nature for it is at such a good that Nature has aimed
for man.
Curiously enough, however, Aristotle obliges rulers
and statesmen to pay heed to Nature, not to the phronimos,
in their ruling of men.

In the Protrepticus it is held that

the statesman must have certain landmarks taken from
Nature and truth itself (a~o ~~~ ~uoew~ au~~~
xal ~~~ 4A~9eia~
) by reference to which he will
judge what is just, what is good, and what is expedient
••• the best vo~o~ is that which is planted in the
greatest possible conformity with Nature ( x.a~cl
~UOlV
).
106
And in the Nichomachean Ethics, as we saw, the statesman
must have a knowledge of man's soul and the end for which
he has been designed by Nature, since his duty is to effect
the excellence and well-being of the populace.
Perhaps the underlying reason here is that if in the
community of Nature things, unless prevented, are always
brought naturally to their good ·and are ordered in the best
possible way, the statesman has much to gain from the study
of Nature in his attempt to do the same for society.

If so._

106- D~ring, Aristotle's Protrepticus, 8 47. See also
ibid., 8 46: "Good lawmakers too must have a general knowledge of nature ( ~iic; cpuoewc;
) •"
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then Nature becomes
value of human acts.

mo~e

than a criterion for the moral

It is now a source of enlightenment

for the correct and good direction of the state as well.

CHAPTER III
NATURE AND MORAL HABIT
In Nature then, according to ~ristotle, whatever comes
to be does so for its own characteristic good, and by natural design.

Nature's workmanship is throughout teleological,

ordering all things to their proper completion and fulfillment.

On different levels, however, this is accomplished

in-different ways.

In those things lacking knowledge and

hence awareness of their end we are wont to attribute the
attainment of their end, Aristotle points out, exclusively
to the agency of Nature.

The seed becomes a plant, the

fawn a deer, "the swallow makes its nest and the spider its
web"- all instances of the teleological direction of natural processes, all of which, however, occur without any deliberation or conscious seeking.

It is by Nature that this _
occurs, Nature which is the cause. 107
The relation of man, however, to his end differs.

It

is nobler than those on the levels of life below him for it
involves a life according to reason.

With man action for

an end involves the knowledge that it is good, the subsequent wishing for it, and the conscious deliberation about
the means to attain ito

Comparing and evaluating the means

or actions possible for a given end he can then decide as
to their suitability and choose accordingly-- all of which
107-

Physics, II, 8, 199a 20-30.

108-

E.N., III, 3, 1113a 4-14.
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is absent in the leves of life below him.

109

Thus, in man while some processes are solely under
natural control, e.g., aging and dying,

110

others are not.

These are the actions which his choice initiates-- actions
111
over which he has control,
of which he is the efficient
and conscious final cause,
responsible.

112

and hence for which he is held

They are done knowingly and from purpose for

an attainable end after deliberation has shown the course
of action best suited to that end, and with full awareness
of all the circumstances involved.

These being the condi-

tions for ascribing responsibility for an action are also,
therefore, the conditions for praise and blame. 113
thereby also merit the attribution of virtuous and

They
vicious,~

when such actions have become a matter of habit, since the
excellence or depravity of one's character are objects of
.

pra~se

or bl ame. 114

109- £.N., III,
ed here for they
ability to judge
1225b 26-27; II,
110-

f.N.,

2, 1111b 10-13. Children, too, are includlack experience and hence the knowledge and
things adequatelyo Cf. f.f., II, 10,
10, 1226b 21-22.

V, B, 1135a 34- b 1o

111- E.N., III, 3, 1113a 10-12.
36-38 and II, 10, 1226b 34-35.
112-

Cf.

f.E.,

£.N., III~ 5, 1113b 17 and VII, 8, 1151a 16.

I I i 6, 1222b 18-20.

113-

II, 10, 1225b

f.N.,

Cf.

E.f.,

III, 1-5, 1109b 30 - 1114b 25.

114- E.N., 1!, 5, 1105b 29-32; cf.
II, 6,-1Z23a 9-11.

f.£.,

VII, 15, 1249a 26;
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Virtue and vice, than, are a matter of choice; 115 it
is through our own agency that they come about. 116 Thus
•
moral virtue or vice, the habits of our appetitive powers,
is something that is our own responsibility.
On this point Aristotle is clear.
appetitive powers are morally neutral.

Of themselves the
It is only by hab-

ituation, repeatedly choosing or acting in the same way,
that they take on a moral value and become states of character.

No one therefore can be born morally virtuous or
vicious; rather man is by nature pre-mora1. 117
That this is the case Aristotle makes clear in the
Nichomachean Ethics by contrasting Nature and habit.

(1)

Whatever is by Nature cannot be altered while the appetitive powers can be, depending on their degree of habituation
as well as that towards which they have been habituated.
(2) The faculties, which are in us by Nature, do not arise
from habituation.

for example, it is not through repeated

115- E._N., II, 5, 1106a 3-4; VI, 12, 1144a 19; II, 6,
1106b 36. Cf. f.f., II, 6, 1223a 17-20: Virtue and vice, being voluntary, are done from deliberate choice; and III, 1,
1230a 27: "All virtue implies deliberate choice." (English
tr~nslation by J. Solomon in The Works of Aristotle Translated Into English, .Q.E• cit., 1966, Vol. r'x:)
116- f.~., III, 5, 1113b 3-20; III, 5, 1114b 22-25; cf.
E.E., II, 6, 1222b 17-19; II, 6, 1223a 1-16.
117- E.N., II, 1, 1103a 14- 1103b 22; cf. Magna ffioralia
(hereaftir m.m.), I, 6, 1186a 3-8. We should. note that
though the authorship of the m.m. is debated, we will nevertheless refer to it. for our topic covers the Aristotelian
ethics, and the m.m. has always been allowed a place in the
Aristotelian corpus.
·
·
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acts of seeing that one has the faculty of sight; rather,
first one has the faculty and then sees because of it.

{3)

The appetitive powers, finally, can admit of contrary habits,
viz., virtue or vice, while that which is by Nature is in118
capable of contraries.
Our moral habits, then, are not in us by nature; by
nature we are indifferently disposed towards them.

These

states of character, according to Aristotle, come about only
through repeated acts and practice, 119 and are strictly the
results of human agency.
Instruction, however, is also essential here.

for

~x-

ample, in the case of moral virtue it would seem, Aristotle
suggests, to require the instruction of one who already
knows from experience what the correct and excellent thing
to do is. 12
For just as it is unlikely that one could get

°

to a certain destination without first knowing where it is,
so also it would seem unlikely that one would do the right
thing without first knowing what it is.
Of equal importance is Aristotle's tenet that to be
morally virtuous requires practice.

Here virtue is likened

118- For these contrasts see£.~., II, 1, 1103a 19- b 22;
cf. f.E., VII, 14, 1247a 31-33; II, 2, 1230b 3-4; VII, 2,
12~8a l0-11~
The argument also appears, but in a less precise form, in the ~.ffi., I, 6, 1186a 2-8.

6-'

119- Politics, VIII, 1, 1337a 19-20 and E.N., II, 1, 1103b
14-18. See too Rhetoric, I, 11, 1370a
where Aristotle
says that whatever has been habituated becomes, as it were,
natural; also On memory ~ Reminiscence, 2, 452a 30 and .
f.N., X, 9, 1180a 1.
120-

£.~.,II,

1, 1103b 2-18.
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to excellence in a ctaft.

As the cobblert for instance,

gains ease with and becomes better at his craft through
practice, so also repetition in doing what is right makes
it easier to do and one more virtuous.

Just as one learns

a craft by actually working at it, e.g., men become builders by buiding houses, so one becomes virtuous by actually
-- virtuous acts. 121
doing
Unlike the crafts, however, where the good done lies
in the product and not the agent, the excellence that virtuous habituation brings about remains in the agent. 122 The
virtues, in other words, are principles of action perfective.
of the agent such that the good of a virtuous action is
identical with the agent himself.
Hence, that an act be virtuous, i t is not enough that
it be performed virtuously.

The agent himself must be vir-

tuous. (i-n addition to instruction and practice, thent vir1.

tue requires that its agent have knowledge of what is right
and what he is doing.

And that what he does be done from a

permanent state of character, out of deliberate choice, and

for its own sake] An action then, though i t may appear virtuous; is so only when the one performing it is.

And this

is not possible unless all the conditions for virtue have

been met.

123

121- E•.!::!•t II, 1, 1103a 14- b 26; cf. E.~., II, 4, 1105a
18-19; II, 4, 1105b 9-13; and E.E., II, 2, 1220a 38- b 6.
122-

£•!•' II, 4, 1105a 27 - b 4.

123-

!·~·'II,

4, 1105a 28-34.
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The moral habits, therefore, according to Aristotle
are not in us by Nature.
of our choice,

124

They come about through the agency

on how we have chosen to habituate our-

selves, and in light of how we have been trained and instructed.

What is ours by N~ture in this case are those

powers that are to be habituated to right or wrong, as well
as the natural propensities we might have to some virtues or
vices which could make this habituation more or less easy. 125
In the case of propensities towards vice, however, this would
more accurately be characterized as defects in nature, rather
than the result of it.

Thus, e.g., Aristotle characterizes

the tendency to be frightened by everything, "even the sound
of a mouse 11 ,

as beneath the human, and the enjoyment of un-

natural pleasures, whether by habit or natural depravity, as
. 1 • 126
b es t 1a
The propensity towards good habituation, on the other
hand, is characterized as a natural virtue ( ~ua'x~

4-

pe~~),127 and is a division of virtue that appears in the
Eude~ian Ethics, Nichomachean Ethics, and Magna Moralia. 128
124-

E.N., VI, 1, 1139a 31-32.

125-

[.H.,

II, 1, 1103a 24-25.

126- See£.~., VII, 5, 1149a 8-9 and VII, 5, 1148b 17-24;
also VII, 5, 1149a 10-11.
127-

m.m.

1281199b
1234a
1144b

In the m.m. at I, 34, 1197b 36- 1198a 21 and II, 3,
37- 1200a 5; the E.£., II, 1, 1220a 10-11, III, 7,
24-32; the f·H•t VI, 13, 1144b 2-17 and VI, 13,
33 - 1145a 2.

I, 34, 1198a 4, II, 3, 1199b 37-38~
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The theory that is set forth in these is that a natural
virtue is a disposition for a certain virtue, but exists
apart from reason and choice.

It is not something that we

have by our own effort but rather by nature.

Such propen-

sities, then, are not virtues in the true or full sense,
but rather capacities that, when under the right guidance
and correct habituation, become principles of action that
are chosen in accord with reason.

They are, Aristotle points

out, related to the true virtues in the same way cleverness
is to prudence.

Cleverness is the natural ability of siz-

ing things up quickly for one's advantage and acting accordingly.

Prudence, too, is acting in accord with this immed-

iate grasp of a situation, but now in line with the good
that is directly perceived there.

Here one's motivation

is not personal advantage but the right to be done.

And

this because in prudence reason is right and the directive
of what is good.

The formation of this reason, however, re-

quires proper instruction and experience, while cleverness
requires neither.

If one is possessed of it,

however~

with

proper instruction and habituation acquiring this reason
comes about much more easily and quickly. 129
Thus there are natural tendencies in us to certain
virtues.

Some are friendlier or more temperate in nature

than others, while others seem able to
or pain.

more hardship

These good natural qualities, however, are merely

starts in the right direction.
129-

endur~

f.N.,

They become habits of excel•

VI, 13, 1144b 2-17; and VII, 8, 1151a 23-25.
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lence only through practice and choice, after proper guidance.
Though we may be naturally endowed, then, with certain
good qualities, if we are to be virtuous it is our business
to choose in accordance with the good

instructio~

so that these qualities can be fully perfected.

given us
Only by so

choosing can we become grounded in good ways of acting such
that they become part and parcel of our makeup.
act~ng

By always

in accord with this right choice, desiring only what

is right because our knowledge tells us it is so, we forge
a personality and character that is praised for its virtue.
Our natural good qualities develop into permanent states of
right character, states whose excellence we oursel~e~ have
brought about.
Thus, though we be naturally endowed with these good
qualities, this does not suffice to make us good.

For Arist-

otle a truly virtuous character also requires the individual's
own intention to be good, and rightly acting so that he does
become good.

Habituation to what is right, therefore, be-

comes all-important in character building.

Only in this way

can one appreciate what is good and become readily adept at
doing it.
What we have then by nature are certain potencies, certain inborn capacities, for moral excellence that become
virtuous states through choice and habit.

Of themselves,

therefore, the natural virtues are incomplete.

Virtue in

the true sense is a fixed disposition for doing what is good,

and not

m~rely
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an inclination or propensity for it.

in the true sense, therefore, completes natural

Virtue

v~rtue,

brings to completion what is at first only an aptitude for
excellence.

The good development of these propensities for

Aristotle calls for the individual's decision who, if
schooled and trained in the right way, will much more readily
diseover the good sense of his decision than one who has not
had these benefits.
We see then that for Aristotle the development of good
capacities is not so simple a task.

Required for its success

are Nature, the discipline and instruction of one already
well-practiced in virtue, the habituation, then, in line
with what is right, and the receptivity and willingness to
learn

of the one being trained.

All four must be present

and in harmony with one another before any positive result
can come about. 130
Thus, in his theory of moral habits Aristotle has seen
reason to discuss Nature from two points of view.

moral

virtue and vice are not inborn; we do not have them by nature, but rather through our own agency.

Virtue and vice

are things within our power and become permanent dispositions of • the soul through our repeated choice.

Where choice

is in accord with the right rule virtue comes about; when in
conflict, vice.
A corollary to this, then, is th~t happiness is not
ours by nature.
130-

For this consists in excellence of soul,.

Politics, VII, 13, 1332a 40- b 7.
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and that "depends on the individual and his personal acts
being of a certain character. 11131
What we do have, though, by way of natural endowment
are certain givens-- certain capacities waiting to be tapped
and brought to their proper excellence by the presence and
co-operation of our other three conditions mentioned above.
They are starts in the right direction, and this accounts
for their importance in good character formation.

Like our

other three conditions, if these capacities are not there,
it is difficult to see how one could become morally good.
They seem well-nigh indispensable, in fact, which is evidence
enough again to show the significance of Nature in Aristotle's ethical theory.
131- E.E., I, 3, 1215a 15-17. English translation by J.
Solomon In The Works of Aristotle Translated Into English,
~· cit.

CHAPTER IV
VIRTUE AS AN ImiTATION OF NATURE
True virtue for Aristotle is, we have seen, a perfection of the individual agent.

In the moral sphere it is that

state in which the passions are moderated through the directive of reason, disposing the agent therefore to act in
the best possible way with regard to them. 132 Reason, as
Ari~totle

insists, is inherent to moral virtue, then, since

it is only through reason that we can choose what is right,
the distinguishing mark of all moral virtue.

It is by this

rectitude of choice that moral virtues arise, at the same
time sustaining and sharpening reason's perception of what
is right as well as perfecting the desire for what is good.
It is such qualities of soul that are the characteristics of virtuous men, and by which life is maintained in
the best possible way.

The benefit of reason upon the

passions, in other words, is that its directives there provide for our overall well-being.

As the rule by which we

avoid the harms that excess and defect bring its observance,
e.g., keeps us in sound physical condition, as in the case
of temperance and good temper or, in the case of courage,
correctly aware of what it is right to endure for the sake
. 133
of the noble.
In all elements of the moral sphere it is
132- £.!., II, 6, 1106b 36- 1107a 8~ cr. m.m., I, 7-a,
1186a 20-33; I, 9, 1186b 33-36, II, 10, 1208a ~-21; E.E.,
II, 3, 1220b 32-33; and Politics, IV, 11, 1295a 37-3~.133- See E.N., II, 2, 1104a 12-20; II, 3, 1104b 27-36; II,
6 1 1106b 18-27; IV, 5, 1125b 26- 1126a 31, and III, 6,
1115a 7 - 1116a 15.
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the reasonable, that which is right, that advances what is
best 134 and, as Aristotle notes, what evokes the admiration
and encouragement of others.
Living well, then, is secured through a reason that is
open to and appreciative of what is inherently good.

It is

the guage for what is right in each circumstance, the right
rule for good living.

In fact, through good living Aristotle
holds such a rule becomes a habit of mind, 135 th~ skill of
perceiving directly the right thing to be done in a given
circumstance.

Such acuity of thought is the excellence of

practical reasoning, the fixed disposition of intellect by
which actions productive of our well-being are brought about.136

It is knowledge infallibly directive of the good
to be done, 137 and precisely because this is what it is

right to do.
We have here, then, some parallels to Nature's operations.

Nature, as we saw, is for Aristotle an agency of

134- E.E., II, 5, 1222a 6-10: "Virtue is that sort of habit
from which men have a tendency to do the best actions, and
through which they are in the best disposition towards what
is best; and the best is what is in accordance with right
reason, and this is the mean between excess and defect relative to us." English translation by J. Solomon in The
Works of Aristotle Jranslated Into English, £E• cit.--135- This is a clear enough inference from the fact that for
Aristotle "practical wisdom is a right rule" about things to
be done in human conduct (f.~., VI, 13, 1144b 26-29) and, as
we have seen, arises through habits rightly formed.
136~

E.!·~

137-

E.N., VI, &, 1141a 3-5.

VI, 5, 1140a 24-28; VI, 5, 1140b 8-10;
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good.

It always brings the best to pass, prescribing ends

such that things are ordered in the best possible way.
These ends, furthermore, are the proper good of natural
things and the perfection of their coming to be.
Nature which provides in this coming to be for the

It is
har~ony

and good organization of all bodily parts and functions. 138
.-

as well as the balance and regularity needed to preserve
the various levels of life at large.
In the moral sphere, however, we saw that it is reason,
the rational principle, that accounts for the good disposition of the passions.

By bringing them in line with what

is good, it effects an equilibrium among them in much the
same way Nature does among the bodily parts.

And as this

equilibrium that Nature ordains advances and sustains the
organism's well-being, so also does the directive of reason.
Each of the passions brought to its proper good contributes
139
to the general well-being of the whole man.
Right reason, then, is for Aristotle an agency of
Like Nature it "is on the lookout for what is best",
urging us "aright and towards the best objects". 140 And as

good.

a habit of mind it is a permanent disposition towards such
things, just as Nature is a permanent principle of good in
138-

Qg Generations Animalium, II, 4, 740b 26 - 741a 3.

139- for a detailed informative discussion 6n the parallels
for Aristotle between bodily and moral excellences see Theodore J. Tracy, Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of ~
~ ln Pl~to and Aristotle.
Chicago: Loyola University ·
Press, 1969, pp. 227-61.
140- See m•.ffi., II, 2, 1199a 10-11 and f.N., I, 13, 1102b
16-17.

the world.
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This permanent disposition, however, is the

virtue of the morally good man, making obvious the analogy:
what Nature accomplishes on a large scale, the good man accomplishes on the small scale in his own life.

He, there-

fore, will act rightly, for "nothing contrary to Nature is
right", do what is best since this is what Nature does, and
thereby promote his own well-being, which is in line with
the design of Nature.
The morally good man, though, the one wise in practical
matters, has all the other moral virtues. 141 Because he
habitually acts rightly, in each circumstance he will therefore display the appropriate moral virtue.

This, however,

he can do only if he acts from a knowledge that is right,
is, in other words, possessed of practical wisdom.

Pract-

ical wisdom and the other moral virtues go hand in hand,
the presence of one implying that of the other.
These virtues, however, whose full integration signifies complete excellence of character, are all the best
states of the appropriate powers of the sou1. 142 They bring
these into good condition and enable each faculty, thereby,
to do its work we11. 143 That function, in other words, for
which each power has been designed is best accomplished only
when that power has been perfected.
Virtuous states, then, as the best conditions of the
141-

f..£!., VI, 1:S,_ 1145a 1-2.

142-

f..N., VI, 1, 1139a 15-16;

143-

f..N., II, 6, 1106a 15-20.

m.m.,

I, 4, 1185a 36-39.

47
soul are really states that accord with Nature.

For only

what is best can accord with Nature, and clearly these
states are what is best in man.

The moral virtues, there-

fore, accord with man's end, for this is by Nature.

Man,

therefore, in being morally virtuous is following the desi9~

of Nature.

Put otherwise, to be good is natural to

man; is that towards which his nature

inclj~es,

and is that

which completes his nature when he has become fully virtuous.
This fullness of virtue, however, goes beyond simply
excellence of character.

As the appetitive powers have

their perfections, so also, Aristotle .. holds, do the intellectual.

We have already seen this in the case of phrenes-

is, that true and reasoned capacity, infused with right desire, about the things that are good and bad for man. 144
Correspondingly, the excellence of the scientific faculty
is truth about things necessary, eternal, and which cannot
be otherwise.

Art reasons truly about things to be made,

and makes them well.

Nou'

is the excellence of grasping

the indemonstrable principles of science, while philosophy
is the union of

vou'

and science, i.e., the knowledge of

first principles and what necessarily follows from them
144- E.fl., VI, 5, 1140b 1-6 and VI,
VI, 2, 1139a 29-31.

5~

1140b 20-21; also

. 145
in demonstrations. ·
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Each one of these excellences is a fixed disposition
of soul, a perfected habit of mind, that has been effected
. th er b y ~ns
. t rue t.~on 146 or, ~n
. th e case o f vou'
e~
, .experience.

None of these habits, though, Aristotle holds, could

have arisen unless the passions had in some degree already
been moderated. 147 Left to excess or defect, they would do
violence to both body and soul, causing all forms of conflict and stress.

It is only when they are in a good condi-

tion that the higher functions of the soul can be carried
out, making their excellence indispensable to intellective
activity.
The highest of our intellective activities, however,
is contemplation.

It is what is most proper to us, and

145- For this classification of the excellences of the
soul's cognitive powers see~.~., VI, 2-7, 1139a 26 1141a 19. llie should note, too, the parallel function of
vou' in the strictly theoretical sphere to its function in
the practical sphere. In both cases Aristotle assigns to
it the role of immediate, non-discursive, apprehension-it therefore serving as the starting-point of both theoretical and practical reasoning. On this also see footnote
101, page ~9, of this thesis.
146-

f·li·• II, 1, 1103a 15-16.

147- This is either implicit in or directly expressed at
f.N., III, 11, 1118b 22- 1119a 18; VII; 9, 1151b 4-11; VII,
7, 1150a 9-13; VII, 10, 1152a 15-16; VII, 8, 1151a 20-28;
II, 6, 1106b 17-22; and ffi•ill•• II, 10, 1208a 9-21. Here Aristotle holds
act ••• in accordance with right reas.. , that "\"to
...
on (xet't'd 't'OV opeov AOyov
) is when the irrational part of
the soul does not prevent the rational part from displaying
it:s own activity", i.e., "when ••• the passions do not hinder
the mind from performing its own work, then you will have
what is done in accordance with right reason." English
translation by St. George Stock in The Works of Aristotle
Translated Into English, £E• cit., 1966, Vol.-rx~
~
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whose continuous activity constitutes our best

good~

Its

merits are large, being the most pleasant of all things,
fully self-sufficient, complete in itself, and most like
divine life.

It makes the virtuous attainment of all the

other faculties of soul well worthwhile, and can come about
on~~

when their

excel~ences

have been achieved.

ion, then, is a rare good and thus its

Contemplat-

pos$~ssion

highly

. d • 148
prl.ze
For those, however, who have achieved all the other
excellences of soul contemplation can be realized and, when
realized, so also their complete perfection.

With contemp-

lation every power of soul is in its best state, and the
life of virtue therefore complete.
But, we have seen, such perfection is precisely what
Nature had intended for man.

It has ordained him for only

what is best, which in man is a completely virtuous life.
Inasmuch, then, as man is virtuous he imitates

Nature~

through virtue he attains and does what is best.

for

Virtue

emerges then as man's completed natural state; and in this
sense, therefore, we can say that for Arist6tle a completely
good life would be a life complete in accord with Nature.
148-

See £.N., X, 7, 1177a 11-28 and X, 7, 1177b

18-26~

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Life according to Nature, then, is what brings about
man's best good.

Good habituation and instruction accompan-

ied by reason all serve to bring about that for which Nature
has designed us.

Natural propensities, too, are an aid in

this, completing our enumeration of those factors essential
to the fully virtuous life.
Contemplation, however, as that for which man has been
designed by Nature is, for Aristotle, the closest natural
.
1"1 f e. 149 Th e con t emp 1 a t.1ve
. . t a t.1ng d.1v1ne
beings come t o 1m1
man, therefore, is the fifiest expression of

~hat

aspiration

to the divine which Aristotle sees in Nature and identifies
.
150
in terms of final causal1ty.
In the completely virtuous
man, then, Nature comes closest to a share in divine life,
inasmuch as he has achieved the highest excellence possible
to ·a natural being.
With this our survey of Nature as it pertains to moral
excellence in Aristotle is complete.

He clearly sees a large

role for Nature in such excellence and finds it essential to
any study of ethics.

What the thesis claimed at the start

then has been borne out.

And a summary of that here will

enable us now to see it more quickly.
In the first chapter, recounting the literature-of.this
149- See E.N., X, a, 117ab 22-29; cf. Metaphysics, XII, 7,
1072b 13-1~ and XII, 7, 1072b 23-25.
150- That all natural beings strive for the divine is unambiguously stated at De Anima II, 4, 415a 27- 415b a. For·
the account of final causality see metaphysics XII, 7, especially 1072b 3-4.
·
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ce~tury
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made it clear that Nature's importance in

Aristotle~s

ethical theory had not been given due consideration there.
Jaeger's 1923 reading of the Protrepticus and the reaction
to it, as well as to his remarks on the Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics, centered on Aristotle's Platonism or indepeodence thereof, i.e., how steadfast, if ever, was Aristotle 1 s allegiance to the Forms and, in turn,-how convinced
was he of their use in moral knowledge.

Equally an issue

was how the knowledge of the morally good found realization
in practice,

either~

geometrico or by prudential in-

sight~

While we found for Aristotle that it is in fact
through the unrationalizable insight acquired through good
living that the morally good becomes known, Aristotle enlarged upon this by describing such good living as being
according to nature-- i.e., as natural.
chapter two.

This we saw in

Confident of Nature as a pervasive and unalter-

able agency of good, Aristotle set it forth as a model
pattern

~r

for the student of ethics in judging moral act-

ions: to judge an action good or bad is likewise to judge
it as according or contrary to Nature; also to our nature.
What advances or sustains our being is good, 151 and so in
line with Nature; whereas whatever is demeaning to it is
opposed to the fullness of our nature, viz., well-being.
151- See Politics, II, 2, 1261b 9-10. Here Aristotle gives
us a defin~tion of the good that is rarely ever brought out
in discussion on him: "the good of things must be that which
preserves them". English translation by B. Jowett in the
Basic Works of Aristotle, QQ. cit.
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This well-being, though, as our fully natural state,

is the work and funct2on of v1rtuous activity, and is a

l~fetime task.

Such activity, however, as chapter three

discussed, is not in man by nature; nor is its contrary.
These are alterable states, virtue and vice, whereas whatever is by nature is unalterable.

The attainment or non-

attainment of our well-being, therefore, is not due to Nature; it is due, rather, to us.

It is we who are responsible

for our well-being, and thus we who bring it about.
But, chapter four suggests, in so doing we are really
imitating Nature's own workmanship.

If Nature seeks the

good of everything, and virtue in man is precisely this
striving after what is good, to be virtuous is to be like
Nature.

As Nature br2aags i::lbout only what is good, the

virtuous man, inasmuch as he brings about his own good,
does for himself what Nature does at large.

And this he

does through reason, whose excellence in practical matters
therefore can be likened to Nature, inasmuch as both bring
about only what is good.
Aristotle's ethical theory, then, includes within it
a significant role for Nature, and it was this that merited
our attention here.

Simply stated, Aristotle has suggested

that in Nature we may find something worthy of our consideration for understanding of human conduct and then why human
action, at its best, is fully natural.

/
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Three definitive studies on the Protrepticus have ap-

peared since D.J. Allan's remark in his 1956 review of Ross•
Fragmenta Selecta (see Classical Review, VI (1956), 224-5)
that no one who had hitherto edited the Fragments sought to
discern their proper sequence or general argument: W.G. Rabinowitz, Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of Its Reconstruction.

Berkeley: University of California Press,

1957; Ingemar During, Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt

At Reconstruction.

Goteborg: Eleanders Boktryckeri Aktie-

bolag, 1961; and A.-H. Chroust, Aristotle: Protrepticus,
A Reconstruction.
Press, 1964.

Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame

Of these three I have chosen During's edition

since (A) Chroust's "has freely drawn upon" it, as well as
widely utilize "D~ring's selection and arrangement of the
fragments" (p. v, Chroust).

Further, Chroust himself re-

commends that for "a more penetrating treatment and study of
the Protrepticus" we go to D~ring (p. v, Chroust).
(B) Rabinowitz• belief that there is little anyone can
say positively about the Protrepticus (p. 95, Rabinowitz)
has been well-disposed of by During with four arguments.
(1) Rabinowitz held that it was impossible to.have any pasitive evidence for a reconstruction of the Protrepticus and
along with this, then, teaching there which we could ascribe
to Aristotle since no ancient authorities had ever mentioned
the Protrepticus and Aristotle's name together (p. 21, Rabinowitz).

But on this principle, During remJrks, many of the

Pre-socratic fragments now accepted as genuine would have to
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be rejected as spurious while, conversely, many texts {and.
even whole works) that have been conclusively proven to be
spurious would have to be declared genuine {pp. 13-14, During).
(C) During has shown the Protrepticus as he reconstructs it to be Aristotle's through an examination of its
(2-f language: (a) only five per cent of the language does
not agree entirely with Aristotle's usage; the rest is
"written in Aristotle's language and style", a style nknown
to us from writings of undisputed authenticity"; {b) Only
twelve words of its seven hundred word index do not appear
in Bonitz.

"These twelve are all words of the period; we

find them in Plato's dialogues or the Attic orators"; (c)
"The fact that the vocabulary is so unambiguously Aristotelian is the first result of the linguistic analysis that
we can book.

It shows that Iamblichus has not tampered

much with the text."
(3) Style: "Every phrase has been carefully examined
and compared with the Academic-Aristotelian usage; the result is reported in the commentray.

Stylistically the

language is remarkably pure, often with an unmistakably
Aristotelian ring. 11
{4) "The inner structure, the manner in which the
author builds up a series of argumsnts"; this, indeed,

.

I would suggest, conclusively proves During's point.
discussion

His

on this, however, is not susceptible to sum-

mary; it is already in its tersest form.

For his argu-
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ment (here, #4)~ then, see pages 18-19 of his "reconstruction".

For his overall three points (nn. 2~ 3, and 4 here)

see pages 17-19.

In addition, his introduction ("The Pro-

blem", pp. 9-39) is quite invaluable; and his reconstruction, appearing as Fragments 8 1-110, a most noteworthy
achievement.

INDEX' OF TEXTS CITED FROm ARISTOTLE
On Youth ~ Old Age
The Protrepticus
8 9
8 13

8
8
8
8
8
8
8

14
15
16
17
20
23
24

8 2-9-

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

30
39
46
47
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
95

I, 5, 469a 29
On the Parts .Q.f. Animals
II, 14, 658a 23
IV, 10, 6a?a 17
De Motu Animalium
I, 6-7
Progression

of

Animals

I, 1, 704b 6
I , 12, 711 a 19
De Generatione Animalium
I, 3, 717a 17
II, 4, 73ab 1
II, 4, 740b 26- 741a 3
Metaphysics

II, 19

XI I,
XII,
XII,
XII,

Physics

Nichomachean Ethics

Analytica Posteriora

II, a, 199a 20-30
. II, a, 199a 26-29
II, a, 199a 34- b 2

7

7, 1072b 3-4
7, 1072b 13-15
7, 1072b 23-25

I, 2-4, 1094a 1a - 95b 11
I, 3-6, 1095a 1 - 97a 15
I, 4, 1095b 4-13
I, 7, 1097a 26-34
De Generatione ~ Corruptione I, 7, 1097a 34- b 20
I, 7, 1097b 22-27
II, 10, 336b 27
I, 7, 1097b 30-35
I, 7, 1098a 1-20
De Anima
I, 7, 1 09ab 2-4
I, 9, 1099b 20-23
II, 4, 415a 27 - 415b 8
I, 13, 11 02a 7-24
III, 11, 434a 16-21
I, 1 3, 11 02b 16-17
III, 12, 435b 2-7
I I , 1 , 11 03a 14-16
II, 1, 1103a 14- b 22
QD Memory ~ Reminiscence
II, 1, 1103a 14- b 26
I I , 1 ; 11 03a 1 5-16
I, 2, 452a 30
II, 1, 1103a 19- b 22
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II, 1, 1103a 24-25
II, 1, 1103b 2-18
II, 1, 1103b 14-18
II, 2, 1104a 12-20
II, 3, 1104b 27-36
II, 4, 1105a 18-19
II, 4, 1105a 27- b 4
II, 4, 1105a 28-34
II, 4• 1105b 9-13
II, 5, 1105b 29-32
I I, 5, 11 06a 3-4
I I, 6, 11 06a 15-20
II, 6, 1106b 17-22
II, 6, 1106b 18-27
II, 6, 1106b 36
II, 6, 1106b 36 - 1107a 8
III, 1-5, 1109b 30 - 1114b 25
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III, 3, 1113a 4-14
I I I, 3, 1113a 1 0-12
III, 4, 1113a 32-35
III, 5, 1113b 3-20
III, 5, 1113b 17
III, 5, 1114b 22-25
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III, 7, 1115b 23
III, 11, 1118b 22- 1119a 18
IV, 5, 1125b 26 - 1126a 31
8, 1135a 34 - b 1
VI, 1 , 1139a 1 5-16
VI, 1, 1139a 21
VI, 2-7, 1139a 26 - 1141a 19
VI, 2, 1139a 29-31
v~, 3, 1139b 26-31
\11, 5, 1140a 24-28
VI, 5, 1140b 1-6
VI, 5, 1140b 8-10
VI, 5, 1140b 20-21
VI, 6, 1141a 3-5
VI, 9, 1142b 31
VI, 11, 1143a 33-35
VI, 11, 1143b 3-5
VI , 12, 1144a 1 9
VI, 12, 1144a 29-31
VI, 13, 1144b 2-17
VI, 13, 1144b .24-25
VI, 13, 1144b 26-29
VI, 13, 1144b 33 - 1145a 2
VII, 3, 1147a 25-32
VII, 5, 1148b 17-24
VII, 5, 1149a 8-9
VII, 5, 1149a 10-11
VII, 7, 1150a 9-13
VII, 8, 1151a 15-19

v,

VI I , 8, 11 51 a 1 6
VI I, 8, 1151 a 20-28
VII, 8, 1151a 23-25
VII, 9, 1151b 4-11
VII, 10, 1152a 7-10
VII, 10, 1152a 15-16
VII, 11, 1152b 1
X, 7, 1177a 11-28
X, 7, 1177b 1 8-26
X, 7, 1178a 5-8
X, 7, 1178a 7
x, 7, 1178b 22-29
x, 7, 1179b 21-27
Magna IYioralia
I, 4, 1185a 36-39
I, 6, 1186a 2-8
I, 6, 118oa 3-8
I, 7-8, 1186a 20-33
I, 9, 1186b 33-36
I, 34, 1197b 36 - 98a 21
I, 34, 1198a 4
I I , 2, 1199a 10-11
II, 3, 1199b 37-38·.·
II, 3, 1199b 37 - 1200a 5
I I, 10, 1208a 5-21
I I, 10, 1208a 7-21
E udemian Ethics
I, 3, 1215a 15-17
II, 1, 1219a 24-38
II,. 1, 1220a 10-11
II, 1-2, 1220a 38 - b 6
II, 2, 1220b 3-4
II, 3, 1220b 32-33
II, 5, 1222a 6-10
II, 6, 1222b 17-19
I I, 6, '1222b 18-20
I I , 6, 1 223a 1-1 6
II, 6, 1223a 9-11
II, 6, 1223a 17-20
II, 8, 1224b 32-34
II, 10, 1225b 26-27
II, 10, 1225b 36-38
II, 10, 1226b 21-22
II, 10, 1226b -34-35
I I, 10, 1227a 18-23
II, 10, 1227a 20-30
I I I , 1 , 1230a 27
III, 7, 1234a 24-32
VI I , 2, 1238a 1 0-11
VII, 6, 1240b 20-21
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VII, 14, 1247a 31-33
VII, 15, 1249a 26
Rhetoric
I, 11, 137Da 6-7
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